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the 18-item need for cognition scale (nFc-18) is the most commonly used tool to measure the 
need for cognition. the aim of this study was to explore the possibility of developing an abbrevi-
ated version of the scale, applying the item response theory (irt). item response theory analyses 
suggested the exclusion of eight items that did not perform well in measuring the latent trait. the 
resulting 10-item scale (nFc-10), which included highly discriminative items, covered the same 
range  of the measured trait as the original scale and showed high measurement precision along 
various levels of the trait. Additionally, since irt analyses can only confirm the accuracy of the short 
scale in measuring the underlying construct, we sought to replicate the nomological net of the 
nFc-18 using the shortened version of the scale. the results showed that the nFc-10 reflects an 
adequate operationalization of the construct, in line with the longer version. in particular, as ex-
pected, the nFc-10 showed moderate relations with various measures of cognitive skills and self-
report measures of cognitive styles, confidence, and anxiety. these findings confirm that we have 
obtained a much shorter version of the nFc that maintains excellent reliability and validity
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IntroductIon
Need for cognition (NFC) is a stable individual characteristic defined 
as a tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activities 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Interindividual variation in NFC has been 
conceptualized as falling along a continuum from low to high. Both in-
dividuals low in NFC and individuals high in NFC must make sense of 
the world, but they tend to derive meaning, adopt positions, and solve 
problems in somewhat different ways. Individuals high in NFC natu-
rally tend to seek, acquire, think about, and reflect on information, and 
they engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activity. Individuals with 
low NFC, by contrast, are more likely to rely on others (e.g., experts 
and instruments), they avoid detailed information about the world and 
find cognitively effortful problems or tasks stressful (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982). They also tend to adopt cognitive heuristics. In other words, in-
dividuals with low NFC are characterized by low intrinsic motivation 
to engage in effortful cognitive endeavors, whereas individuals with 
high NFC are characterized by high intrinsic motivation to exercise 
their mental faculties (Cacioppo, Petty, & Jarvis, 1996). 
Need for cognition is a thinking disposition, similar to open-
minded thinking, need for closure, reflectivity, superstitious think-
ing, and dogmatism (Cacioppo et al.,1996; Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996; Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012; Stanovich, 2011; 
Stanovich & West, 2007; Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 
1994), which are important aspects of what is called the reflective mind 
(Sinatra & Pintrich, 2003; Stanovich, 2009, 2011; Sternberg, 2003). For 
example, people who are more prone to think hard and invest cog-
nitive effort in the reasoning process are more likely to recognise the 
need to apply the correct rules and less inclined to use tempting, but 
incorrect heuristics (e.g., Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 
2004; Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002; Stanovich 
& West, 1999; however, see e.g., Morsanyi, Primi, Chiesi & Handley, 
this is an open access article under the cc By-nc-nd license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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2009). Moreover, differences in NFC could lead to different ways to 
process and interpret information and, consequently, different ways to 
choose and pursue individual goals. Specifically, higher NFC is linked 
to a higher number of goals that require reasoning and problem solv-
ing (Gollwitzer, Kappes, & Oettingen, 2012). For instance, Wu, Parker, 
and De Jong (2014) proposed that individuals with high NFC are 
more likely to engage in innovative processes that require dealing with 
complex situations, investing effort, and developing new strategies and 
solutions in the workplace. 
To measure NFC, Cacioppo and Petty (1982) developed a 34-item 
inventory, but the most commonly used version includes 18 items from 
the original scale (the Need for Cognition Scale, NFC-18; Cacioppo, 
Petty, & Kao, 1984), which are rated on a 5-point Likert scale. The items 
describe a variety of situations in which people could choose to gather 
information, analyze available evidence, abstract from past experi-
ence, or synthesize ideas; items dealing with potentially noneffortful 
cognitive activities such as reveries, mystical or religious experiences, 
daydreaming, and artistic ruminations were intentionally excluded. 
The items were also worded to avoid responses limited to particular 
domains, problems, or situations and known groups, and cross-
validations were used to select items. Thus, the scale was designed to 
distinguish between individuals varying along a continuum ranging 
from the extreme cognitive miser to the supreme cognizer (Cacioppo 
& Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 1984). 
The NFC-18 is characterized by one dominant factor (Cacioppo et 
al., 1984; Hevey et al., 2012; Sadowski, 1993; Soubelet & Salthouse, 2017; 
Verplanken, Hazenberg, & Palenewn, 1992), high internal consistency 
(e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1984; Sadowski, 1993; Soubelet & Salthouse, 
2017; Woo, Hans, & Kuncel, 2007), and good test-retest reliability 
(Sadowski & Gulgoz, 1992; Soubelet & Salthouse, 2017; Verplanken, 
1991). Moreover, evidence of its validity was provided by testing the 
relationships between NFC scores and the tendency to seek out, scru-
tinize, and use relevant information when making decisions and solv-
ing problems (e.g., Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992; Petty & Jarvis, 1996), 
the desire for new experiences that stimulate thinking (Venkatraman, 
Marlino, Kardes, & Sklar, 1990; Venkatraman & Price, 1990), and the 
tendency to ignore, avoid, or distort information (Petty & Jarvis, 1996; 
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Venkatraman et al., 1990). 
Although the NFC-18 is a popular measure and it has good validity 
and reliability, it might be possible to measure NFC more quickly us-
ing a psychometrically sound shortened version. Indeed, with research 
questions becoming increasingly complex and involving a growing 
number of constructs, shorter scales potentially offer added value 
(Ziegler, Kemper, & Kruyen, 2014). Starting from these considerations, 
the aim of this study was to explore the possibility of developing an 
abbreviated version of the NFC-18 for research purposes. Specifically, 
the aim was to obtain a brief measure that could be more appropriate 
for large, multivariate studies in which many tests and scales need to be 
administered together.
To achieve this, we used item response theory (IRT) analyses, 
which make it possible to select items that offer the most informa-
tion in measuring the targeted underlying trait. Specifically, IRT has 
potential benefits in shortening a scale because it makes it possible to 
evaluate the amount of information provided by each item of the scale 
for each trait level on the trait dimension through the item information 
function (IIF).Whereas the statistical and psychometric meaning of 
information has a technical gist, the meaning is intuitive: If the amount 
of information is large, the trait level can be estimated with precision, 
if the amount of information is small, the trait cannot be accurately 
estimated. Thus, on the basis of item information, it is possible to select 
items that convey the higher amount of information along the entire 
range of the measured trait. When a single item is involved, the amount 
of information at any point on the trait scale is going to be rather small. 
However, through the selection of items that perform better and as-
sure adequate information along the different levels of the trait, a well-
performing shortened scale can be obtained.
Additionally, IRT provides the test information function (TIF), 
which evaluates the precision of the test at different levels of the meas-
ured construct instead of providing a single value (e.g., Cronbach's α) 
for reliability (Embretson & Reise, 2000; Hambleton, Swaminathan, & 
Rogers, 1991). More precisely, the TIF provides information on how 
accurate the test is at estimating a trait along the whole range of trait 
scores: The more information the test provides at a particular trait 
level, the smaller the error associated with ability estimation , and the 
higher the local reliability. Since the TIF is generated by aggregating 
the IIFs, in general, longer tests will measure an examinee’s attribute 
with greater precision than shorter tests. Nonetheless, in the IRT 
framework, item selection can be done ensuring that the TIF of the 
shortened scale maintains an adequate amount of information along 
the trait continuum, which is similar to the original scale. 
Finally, IRT allows the assessment of differential item function-
ing (DIF; Embretson & Reise, 2000). Differential item functioning 
analysis is used to study the performance of items within scales, and 
it examines whether or not the likelihood of endorsing each item is 
equal across subgroups that are matched on the measured trait. For 
example, a randomly selected man with a certain level of NFC and a 
randomly selected woman with the same level of NFC should have 
the same likelihood of endorsing a particular response option for each 
item on the scale. Differential item functioning analysis can be used for 
tailoring the length of psychological scales because it makes it possible 
to identify and exclude items that have differential functioning and, as 
a consequence, produce biased measures.
In the current study, we assessed the psychometric properties of the 
items as well as the characteristics of the whole NFC-18 to select the 
items that conveyed the largest amount of information along different 
levels of the NFC trait. Moreover, we investigated gender DIF aiming 
both to shorten the scale and to confirm the psychometric soundness 
of the obtained shortened scale. Gender invariance was investigated 
because, although gender differences for the NFC scale have not been 
reported (see, Cacioppo et al., 1996 for a review), the NFC has been 
found to be correlated with some measures where gender differences 
are common (e.g., anxiety and school achievement – with females typi-
cally scoring higher on both). Finally, given that IRT analyses can only 
confirm the accuracy of the obtained shortened scale in measuring the 
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underlying construct, validity measures were administered to provide 
evidence that the abbreviated scale still measures NFC adequately. 
Specifically, Smith, McCarthy, and Anderson (2000) stated that a short 
form of a test should meet the same standards of validity as the full 
form. Thus, an important goal in the development of any test’s short 
form should be to replicate the pattern of relationships established for 
the construct as measured by the long form of the test. Following these 
recommendations, we sought to replicate the nomological net of the 
NFC-18, employing the shortened version of the scale. 
Regarding validity, as NFC is a thinking disposition that may be 
related to but not equivalent to cognitive abilities, we investigated its 
relationships with a measure of fluid intelligence, (e.g., Greco & Walter, 
2013; Handley et al., 2004; Hill et al., 2013; Kokis et al., 2002). Second, 
in line with the theoretical and operational definition of the construct 
and previous studies regarding the validity of the NFC scale, its rela-
tionships with reasoning abilities were investigated, assuming that peo-
ple with high NFC are likely to use relevant information when making 
decisions and solving problems (Liberali et al., 2012; Stanovich, 2011) 
and less likely to adopt heuristic shortcuts and to ignore or distort in-
formation (Venkatraman et al., 1990). For this reason, we hypothesized 
that the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005), which meas-
ures the tendency to avoid incorrect heuristic shortcuts and to rely on 
careful deliberation instead, should be positively correlated with NFC. 
We also investigated the correlations between NFC and the 
Probabilistic Reasoning Scale (PRS, Primi, Morsanyi, Donati, Galli, & 
Chiesi, 2017), as poor probabilistic reasoning is often the result of mis-
conceptions (e.g., Fischbein, 1987) and previous studies (e.g., Clinton, 
Morsanyi, Alibali, & Nathan, 2016; Kokis et al., 2002; Morsanyi et al., 
2009; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008) found a positive relationship 
between NFC and probabilistic reasoning (although see Chiesi, Primi, 
& Morsanyi, 2011). Additionally, the PRS includes some arithmetic 
computations, and Dornic, Ekehammar, and Laaksonen (1991) found 
that people with high NFC reported that they found arithmetic tasks 
easier as compared to people with low NFC. According to Cacioppo 
et al. (1996), this is because people with high NFC are generally more 
practiced at performing familiar tasks, which leads to higher fluency 
and accuracy. Based on these premises, we expected that NFC would 
also be related to math fluency (i.e., the ability to correctly solve a 
large number of relatively simple arithmetic tasks within a short time 
frame). 
In addition to measuring performance on cognitive tasks, we also 
investigated the relations between NFC and various self-report meas-
ures. Factor-analyses of longer versions of the scale have identified 
confidence as one of the underlying factors of NFC (Tanaka, Panter 
& Winborne, 1988; Waters & Zakrajsek, 1990). We have measured 
confidence and self-evaluated ability related to quantitative skills by 
administering the Subjective Numeracy Scale (Fagerlin et al., 2007). In 
addition to confidence, several studies investigated the relation between 
anxiety and NFC. Negative correlations have been reported between 
NFC and both state and trait anxiety (Olson, Camp, & Fuller, 1984), 
social anxiety (Mueller & Johnson 1990), math anxiety (Lin, Durbin 
& Rancer, 2016), anxiety about cognitive stressors (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1984), and perceived stress in college undergraduates (Petty & Jarvis, 
1996). Nevertheless, Cacioppo and Petty (1982) found no relation be-
tween NFC and test anxiety. In the current study, we administered a 
math anxiety scale to investigate its relation to NFC.
The last scale that we used for validation purposes was the 
Object-Spatial Imagery and Verbal Questionnaire (Blazhenkova & 
Kozhevnikov, 2009) which measures three types of cognitive style: 
verbal, object-visualizer, and spatial. Cognitive styles represent regu-
larities in cognitive functioning, particularly in the acquisition and 
processing of information. Those who possess a verbal cognitive style 
mainly use verbal-analytical strategies when performing cognitive 
tasks. Verbalizers score higher on tests that require participants to 
formulate thoughts in a verbal format (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 
2009) and on tasks that require the fluent retrieval of declarative knowl-
edge (Morsanyi, O’Mahony, & McCormack, 2017). By contrast, spatial 
visualizers preferentially rely on imagery to represent and transform 
spatial relations. Whereas a verbal cognitive style is more common in 
humanities students, spatial thinking is more characteristic of science 
students, and it has been found to be associated with good perform-
ance on quantitative and mechanical reasoning tests (Blazhenkova & 
Kozhevnikov, 2009; Morsanyi et al., 2017). Finally, object visualizers 
use imagery to construct vibrant, clear images of individual objects, 
whereas they tend to score lower on tasks that require reasoning about 
structure and spatial relations (Hegarty & Kozhevnikov, 1999; Pitta-
Pantazi, Sophocleous, & Christou, 2013). This thinking style has been 
found to be characteristic of fine arts students, and it is linked to some 
aspects of artistic production (Pérez-Fabello, Campos, & Campos-
Juanatey, 2016). Although these thinking styles tend to be independent 
(Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2009), we expected that both verbal 
and spatial thinking styles should be positively related to NFC. That 
is, NFC should be related to high-level skills in cognitive activities, and 
the enjoyment of these, regardless of the nature of these activities (i.e., 
whether they predominantly require verbal or quantitative abilities). 
Regarding the size of the correlations, in their review of the lit-
erature, Cacioppo et al. (1996) reported low to moderate correlations 
between NFC and other constructs, with low correlations for ability 
measures and moderate correlations for self-report scales (with most 
correlations below .35). The only exception, where stronger correla-
tions were found, were self-report scales that measured constructs 
that are conceptually very close to NFC, such as academic curiosity (r 
= .68), and information style orientation (i.e., a tendency to seek out 
and elaborate on self-relevant information, r = .50). A recent study by 
Soubelet and Salthouse (2017) also reported low to moderate correla-
tions (typically ranging from .1 to .3) between NFC and various other 
constructs, with the exception of a strong correlation between NFC 
and the Big Five personality dimension of openness (r = .60). Given 
these earlier findings, we expected modest correlations between NFC 
and the various validity measures, and all these correlations were ex-
pected to be positive, with the exception of the relation between NFC 
and the math anxiety scale. Additionally, employing the shortened 
scale, we expected to replicate the same pattern of correlations as with 
the original scale. Indeed, the NFC-10 was developed excluding the 
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NFC-18 items that provided the smaller amount of information on the 
measured trait (i.e., the items that did not provide additional informa-
tion when measuring NFC). 
Method
Participants
The participants were 634 undergraduate students (Mage = 21.80 years; 
SD = 5.45; 318 females) attending various courses at three different uni-
versities in the South-East and South-West of England and in Northern 
Ireland About 60% of the participants studied psychology (they were 
recruited from two different universities), about 30% studied medicine 
(they were all recruited from the same university), whereas the remain-
ing participants were recruited from the third university by placing ad-
verts around the university campus, and they attended various courses 
(mostly related to science and engineering). All students participated 
on a voluntary basis, and they received ungraded course credit for 
their participation. Ethical approval was obtained separately from the 
institutional ethics committees of each university where data collection 
took place. Participants also provided written informed consent before 
participating in the study.
Materials 
Measures of cognitive skills
To measure fluid intelligence, A 12-item short form of the Raven’s 
Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM; Arthur & Day, 1994) was 
administered. This short form has been shown to have adequate psy-
chometric properties, and it is a valid and reliable instrument (Chiesi, 
Ciancaleoni, Galli, Morsanyi, & Primi, 2012). Three practice items 
from the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1962) were 
administered before the test items. Cronbach’s α in the current sample 
was .74.
The CRT (Frederick, 2005) or its extended version (the CRT-Long, 
Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati, & Hamilton, 2016) was administered 
to all participants1. The original test includes three open-ended prob-
lems, and the extended version includes 3 additional tasks. The CRT 
measures the ability to resist intuitive response tendencies and to rely 
on effortful reasoning instead. An example item is the following: “If it 
takes 5 minutes for five machines to make five widgets, how long would 
it take for 100 machines to make 100 widgets?” The typical incorrect 
heuristic response that first comes to mind is “100 minutes”, but the 
correct response is “5 minutes”. The number of correct responses was 
summed to obtain a total score for both the CRT and the CRT-Long. 
In our sample, Cronbach’s α was .73 for the CRT, and .80 for the CRT-
Long. 
The PRS (Primi et al., 2017) is a 16-item multiple choice question-
naire that provides a comprehensive assessment of basic aspects of 
probabilistic reasoning, including basic and conditional probabilities 
presented in text and tables, reasoning about random sequences 
of events, and the ability to resist some typical fallacies and biases. 
Participants have to select the correct response from three options. An 
example item is the following: “60% of the population in a city are men 
and 40% are women. 50% of the men and 30% of the women smoke. 
We select a person from the city at random. What is the probability 
that this person is a smoker?” Response options are (a) 42%, (b) 50%, 
and (c) 85% (The correct response is 42%). The number of correct 
responses was summed to obtain a total score. Cronbach’s α in the cur-
rent sample was .66.
The Math Fluency (MF) subtest of the Woodcock–Johnson III Tests 
of Achievement (Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001) was used as a 
measure of arithmetic skills. This test assesses the ability to solve simple 
addition, subtraction and multiplication problems quickly (e.g., 5 + 3 
=_; 8 x 6 =_; with the numbers presented vertically). Participants were 
asked to work through a series of problems as quickly and accurately as 
possible within a 3-minute time limit. The total number of items that 
were correctly solved was calculated. 
self-report Measures of cognitive styles and 
anxiety
The 18-item version of the NFC-18 (Cacioppo et al., 1984) con-
sists of nine positively worded items and nine negatively worded 
items. Respondents indicate the extent to which they agree with each 
statement on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (extremely unchar-
acteristic) to 5 (extremely characteristic). An example item is “I find 
satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.” Cronbach’s α for 
the current sample was .83.
The Subjective Numeracy Scale (SNS, Fagerlin et al., 2007) is a 
subjective measure of quantitative ability, which was developed with 
the aim of distinguishing between low-numerate and high-numerate 
individuals. An example item is ”How good are you at working with 
fractions?” The items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale, which are la-
belled differently, depending on the question asked (e.g., ranging from 
1, not good at all, to 6, extremely good,; or 1, never, to 6, very often). A 
single composite score was obtained based on participants’ ratings of 
each item. Cronbach’s α for the current sample was .74.
The Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale (AMAS; Hopko, Mahadevan, 
Bare, & Hunt, 2003) is a short valid math anxiety scale with only 9 
items, using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (low anxiety) to 5 (high 
anxiety). An example item is “Thinking about an upcoming math test 
1 day before.” Cronbach’s α for the current sample was .88.
The 45-item Object-Spatial Imagery and Verbal Questionnaire 
(OSIVQ, Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2009) was administered to as-
sess individual differences in the object-visualizer, spatial, and verbal 
cognitive styles. The following is an example of an item from the verbal 
subscale: “My verbal skills are excellent.” An example item from the 
object imagery scale is “I have a photographic memory.” An example 
of an item from the spatial imagery scale is “I can easily imagine and 
mentally rotate three-dimensional geometric figures.” Participants 
rated their agreement with each item on a 5-point scale, ranging from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Totals for each subscale were 
calculated. In the current sample, Cronbach’s α for the verbal scale was 
.76, for the object visualizer scale it was .70, and for the spatial scale it 
was .80. 
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Procedure
The participants were recruited from various university courses at three 
different UK universities. Each group completed a slightly different set 
of measures, although all participants completed the 18-item NFC 
scale and either the original or the long version of the CRT. Specifically, 
one group of participants (n = 390; 253 females) completed the NFC, 
the CRT-Long, the PRS, the SNS, and the AMAS. A subsample of 
this group (n = 58; 49 females) also took part in an additional testing 
session, where they completed the Raven’s APM, the MF test and the 
OSIVQ. Another group of students (n = 216; 172 females) completed 
the NFC, the Raven’s APM and the original CRT. Finally, a small group 
(n = 28; 17 females) completed the NFC and the original CRT only. 
Each task was briefly introduced and instructions for completion were 
given. All answers were collected in a paper-and-pencil format. 
Analysis strategy 
The IRT analyses were performed using IRTPRO 2.0 (Cai, Thissen, 
& du Toit, 2011) and, according to the NFC-18 response format, 
Samejima’s (1969) graded response model (GRM) was used. The model 
makes three key assumptions about the data: (a) unidimensionality, (b) 
local independence, and (c) that the IRT model fits the data (Reeve & 
Fayes, 2005). In the current study, these assumptions were verified as 
follows.
The single factor structure of the NFC-18 was tested using con-
firmatory factor analysis (CFA) in order to demonstrate that the NFC-
18 set of items measures a single latent construct (θ). After checking 
the distribution of the NFC-18 items for assessment of normality, that 
is, if skewness and kurtosis indices were between the values of -1 and 
1 (Marcoulides & Hershberger, 1997), the CFA was conducted with 
AMOS 5.0 (Arbuckle, 2003) using maximum likelihood estimation on 
the variance-covariance matrix. 
The absence of local dependence (LD) is important for the fit of 
unidimensional IRT modelling because the item parameter estimates 
reflect the latent trait adequately only if there is no association among 
item responses when θ is held constant. The LD, that is, an excess of 
covariation among item responses that is not accounted for by a unidi-
mensional IRT model, was assessed using the χ2 LD statistic (Chen & 
Tiessen, 1997), computed by comparing the observed and the expected 
frequencies in each of the two-way cross tabulations between responses 
to each pair of items. This diagnostic statistic is approximately distrib-
uted as standardized χ2. Given this approximation, as a rule of thumb, 
values of 10 or greater indicate the presence of LD. 
The model’s goodness of fit was evaluated using the M2 statistic and 
the associated root mean square error of the approximation (RMSEA) 
value. As the M2 statistic, similar to other χ2 statistics, is generally un-
realistic because some error will be present in any strong parametric 
model, the RMSEA provides a metric for model errors (Cai, Maydeu-
Olivares, Coffman, & Thissen, 2006). RMSEA values of .05 or less 
indicate a good fit. 
Item response theory models use the original response data for 
estimating probabilities of responses as a function of the latent trait 
θ, which is defined as a continuous variable that conventionally has a 
mean of zero and SD of 1.0. This function describes the relation between 
the probability of endorsing a response given not only the respondent’s 
level of θ but also the item characteristics. The item characteristics in 
the GRM model are estimated by the discrimination (a) and location 
(bi) parameters. The first parameter describes the ability of an item 
to discriminate among people with different levels of the underlying 
trait (e.g., the higher a is, the higher the item’s ability to differentiate 
between people with different levels of NFC). The b parameters rep-
resent an item’s sensitivity in differentiating among the various levels 
of the target trait (i.e., if bs are evenly spaced along the trait, the item 
categories provide a better differentiation in measuring NFC). The IIF, 
graphically represented by the item information curve (IIC), describes 
the amount of information that a particular item provides across the 
entire continuum of the latent construct, and it depends on both the 
discrimination and location parameters. Thus, we used IIFs to select 
the items that conveyed the higher amount of information along the 
range of the trait measured by the NFC-18, looking at the area above 
the IICs, which equals both the size of the a parameter and the spread 
of the b parameters.
To shorten the scale, we also performed gender DIF applying 
the IRT likelihood ratio test approach (IRTLR; Thissen, Steinberg, & 
Wainer, 1988) implemented in the IRTPRO software (Cai et al., 2011). 
This procedure involves comparing differences in log-likelihoods 
(distributed as χ2) associated with nested models. Since DIF analyses 
examine differences in item parameters, for the GRM model two types 
of DIF can be detected: uniform DIF for the location parameters and 
nonuniform DIF for the discrimination parameter. 
Once the shortened scale was defined, all the above described 
analyses were repeated for the brief scale in order to confirm the item 
and test psychometric properties. In particular, we investigated the 
precision of the shortened scale as a whole comparing its TIF with the 
one of the original NFC scale. The TIF is generated by aggregating the 
IIIFs of items in a single measure and it allows to compute the infor-
mation (I), that is, the expected value of the inverse of the standard 
error (SE), provided by the test at each level of the trait. Thus, the more 
information the test provides at a particular trait level, the smaller the 
error associated with trait estimation. Test information can be related 
to traditional reliability coefficients. For short scales, it has been sug-
gested to use McDonald’s ω instead of Cronbach’s α (Schipolowski, 
Schroeders, & Wilhelm, 2014). Thus, we converted I in ω applying the 
formula [= I/(I+1)], proposed by McDonald (2013).
Regarding validity, the Pearson product-moment correlations 
were computed and compared using Steiger’s (1980) z tests in order 
to identify substantive differences in the correlations observed for the 
two different scales.
results 
Preliminarily, an examination of the item distributions revealed that 
they did not deviate significantly from normality: The absolute value 
of skewness indices ranged from 0.08 to 0.96, and kurtosis indices 
ranged from 0.01 to 0.98. Then, the CFA showed that the NFC set of 
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items measured one dimension (CFI = .91, TLI = .90, and RMSEA = 
.053 [C.I. = .046-.060]). All factor loadings were significant (p < .001), 
ranging from .31 to .70. None of the LD statistics were greater than 
10, attesting that there was not an excess of covariation among item 
responses when θ was held constant. The fit statistics of the IRT model 
indicated an adequate fit for the GRM (M2 = 4207.09, df = 2430, p < 
.001; RMSEA = .03). 
Having verified the preliminary assumptions for IRT modelling, we 
looked at the IICs to select the items that conveyed the higher amount 
of information along the range of the trait measured by the NFC-18 
(see Figure 1). The figure clearly shows that items 8, 9, 16, and 18 can 
be excluded because they convey a very small amount of information. 
Moreover, since we aimed to select the better performing items, items 
7, 12, 14, and 17 were also candidates for removal. Finally, the gender 
DIF analysis revealed that seventeen out of eighteen items did not show 
differential functioning across male and female respondents. Only 
item 7 showed uniform DIF (p = .047) and this finding provided an 
additional reason for its exclusion. 
As a result, we retained 10 items and we repeated the analyses for 
this shortened version of the NFC scale (NFC-10). The CFA confirmed 
the one-factor structure of the NFC-10 (CFI = .95, TLI = .93, and 
RMSEA = .062 [C.I. = .049-.074]). All factor loadings were significant 
(p < .001), ranging from .53 to .72. None of the LD statistics were 
greater than 10, indicating the absence of LD. The fit for the GRM was 
also adequate (M2 = 1386.47, df = 710, p < .001; RMSEA = .04). Overall, 
these results showed that the IRT item parameter estimates properly 
reflect the latent trait and describe the psychometric properties of the 
items. Specifically, parameter estimates (see Table 1) indicated that 
each item of the shortened scale performed well at measuring the latent 
Figure 1.
item information courve (iic) of the original 18-item need For cognition (nFc) scale (left) and the 10-item nFc scale (right). 
latent trait (theta) is shown on the horizontal axis (higher values mean higher nFc), and the amount of information and the 
SE yielded by the test at each trait level is shown on the vertical axis.
tAble 1.  
discrimination (a) and location (b) Parameters for each item 
of the Abbreviated need for cognition scale (nFc-10)
Item* a(SE)
b1
(SE)
b2
(SE)
b3
(SE)
b4
(SE)
NFC_1 1.63(0.13)
-1.82
(0.13)
-0.59
(0.07)
-0.11
(0.07)
2.00
(0.15)
NFC_2 2.21(0.18)
-2.36
(0.16)
-1.08
(0.07)
-0.54
(0.06)
1.47
(0.11)
NFC_3 1.54(0.13)
-3.41
(0.30)
-1.40
(0.11)
-0.77
(0.08)
1.49
(0.13)
NFC_4 1.78(0.15)
-2.72
(0.20)
-1.17
(0.09)
-0.66
(0.07)
1.36
(0.11)
NFC_5 1.65(0.14)
-3.07
(0.25)
-1.69
(0.12)
-1.01
(0.08)
1.17
(0.11)
NFC_6 1.31(0.11)
-2.75
(0.22)
-0.56
(0.08)
0.20
(0.08)
2.26
(0.19)
NFC_10 1.58(0.14)
-3.36
(0.29)
-1.85
(0.14)
-0.98
(0.08)
1.35
(0.12)
NFC_11 1.42(0.13)
-3.89
(0.39)
-2.18
(0.17)
-1.20
(0.10)
1.14
(0.12)
NFC_13 1.34(0.12)
-2.96
(0.25)
-1.06
(0.10)
-0.17
(0.08)
2.20
(0.19)
NFC_15 1.44(0.12)
-3.56
(0.32)
-1.31
(0.11)
-0.46
(0.07)
1.52
(0.14)
Note. Numbers refer to the original 18-item version.
trait. Specifically, all item discrimination values were above 1.30, indi-
cating large discriminative power (Baker & Kim, 2004), and location 
parameters were quite evenly spaced (with b1 and b2 well below the 
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Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all measures in the study, 
and the relations between the NFC-18, the NFC-10, and all other 
variables. Despite the relative homogeneity of the sample, there was 
a good range of scores on all measures, including the NFC-18 (M = 
62.55, SD = 10.09; range: 30-88) and the NFC-10 (M = 35.58, SD = 
6.36; range: 15-50). The Pearson product-moment correlations for the 
shortened NFC scale demonstrated that all the investigated relation-
ships were significant and in the expected direction, and the original 
and the shortened scales showed very similar relationships with the 
investigated constructs. Steiger’s z tests showed no significant differ-
ences when comparing the original and the abbreviated scales, except 
for the correlations with cognitive reflection and the object visualizer 
thinking style, which were stronger for the 10-item scale. These results 
confirm that the shortened form replicates the pattern of relationships 
established for the construct as measured by the long form of the test, 
that is, employing the NFC-10, we were able to replicate the nomo-
logical net of the NFC-18. Additionally, some expected relationships 
were even stronger when measured with the abbreviated scale. This 
finding might suggest that some items of the original version did not 
adequately represent the underlying construct and, as a consequence, 
their exclusion resulted in an improved scale. 
tAble 2.  
standard error (SE) and reliability (ω) indices yielded by the 
original (nFc-18) and the shortened (nFc-10) scales for 
each level of the theta (θ) trait
SE ω
θ NFC-18 NFC-10 % change NFC-18 NFC-10 % change 
−3.0 .33 .38 15.1 .90 .87 3.3
−2.5 .32 .36 12.5 .91 .88 3.3
−2.0 .32 .35 9.3 .91 .89 2.2
−1.5 .31 .35 12.9 .91 .89 2.2
−1.0 .30 .34 13.3 .91 .90 1.1
−0.5 .31 .35 12.9 .91 .89 2.2
0.0 .33 .37 12.1 .90 .88 2.2
0.5 .34 .37 8.8 .90 .87 3.3
1.0 .33 .37 12.1 .90 .88 2.2
1.5 .33 .36 9.1 .90 .88 2.2
2.0 .35 .40 14.3 .89 .86 3.4
2.5 .40 .46 15.0 .86 .82 4.6
3.0 .46 .56 21.7 .82 .76 7.3
tAble 3.  
correlations Between the 18- and 10-item versions of the 
need for cognition scale (nFc-18 and nFc-10) and All 
other variables in the study
M (SD) 
Range NFC-18 NFC-10 z
Raven’s APM 
(short form)
5.88 (2.19)
0-11
.18** 
(N=274)
.20*** 
(N=274) −1.06
Cognitive 
Reflection Test  
(CRT)
1.30 (1.15) 
0-3 
.22*** 
(N=621)
.24*** 
(N=621) −1.62
CRT-Long 3.44 (1.98) 0-6 
.23*** 
(N=369)
.27*** 
(N=369) −2.50*
Probabilistic 
Reasoning Scale
13.99 (2.05) 
5-16 
.15** 
(N=362)
.15** 
(N=362) 0.00
Math fluency 109.95 (21.95) 67-158 
.30* 
(N=58)
.33* 
(N=58) −0.70
Verbal thinking 
style
46.86 (7.99) 
31-63 
.39** 
(N=58)
.37** 
(N=58) 0.51
Spatial thinking 
style
42.53 (7.96) 
25-65 
.31* 
(N=58)
.32* 
(N=58) −0.25
Object Visualizer 
thinking style
52.68 (9.99) 
36-90 
−.25* 
(N=58)
−.34** 
(N=58) −2.22*
Abbreviated Math 
Anxiety Scale
14.63 (5.97) 
7-34 
−.36*** 
(N=379)
−.37*** 
(N=379) −0.66
Subjective 
Numeracy Scale
34.53 (7.90) 
12-87
.43*** 
(N=380)
.42*** 
(N=380) 0.68
Note. The z-comparisons were between the correlation coefficients obtained 
for the original (NFC-18) and the shortened (NFC-10) scales. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.mean trait, b3 around the mean trait, and b4 well above it2), indicating 
that the item categories provide an adequate differentiation in measur-
ing the trait. 
The NFC-10 is highly reliable in measuring the different levels of 
the NFC construct continuum. Importantly, the original and short-
ened scales covered exactly the same range of the trait and, compared 
to the 18-item NFC scale, the shortened scale was less precise only at 
the extreme high levels of the NFC latent trait, as displayed in Figure 
2. To quantify the change in reliability between the original and the 
shortened versions, we compared SEs and ωs of the two versions (see 
Table 2). Overall, the percent change in SE was around 12% along the 
different trait levels, with a higher level of decrease (22%) observed for 
the extreme levels of the trait. The percent change in ω was around 
2-3% along the different trait levels and, again, the maximum decrease 
(7%) was observed for the extreme high levels of the trait. These results 
confirm that after excluding almost half of the items, the abbreviated 
scale maintained good accuracy from low to high levels of the trait, that 
is, the unavoidable loss of information did not reduce dramatically the 
reliability of the NFC-10 scale. 
Finally, the gender DIF analysis confirmed that none of the ten 
items showed either uniform DIF (p values ranged from .14 to .94) or 
nonuniform DIF (p values ranged from .30 to .89). Thus, the NFC-10 
was proven to be gender invariant, that is, the scale functions in the 
same way for male and female respondents and it provides unbiased 
measures of NFC.
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dIscussIon
The construct of NFC was first introduced by Cacioppo and Petty 
(1982), and it continues to be commonly used in educational, cogni-
tive and personality psychology research. The most popular version of 
the scale is the NFC-18, introduced by Cacioppo et al. (1984). Item 
response theory analyses offer a way to analyze the contribution of 
each item to measuring NFC, and to select items which ensure precise 
measurement across a range of trait levels. 
Applying IRT, we demonstrated that some items of the NFC-18 
scale did not perform well in measuring the latent trait. After exclud-
ing these items, all remaining items had high discriminative power and 
they measured a large spectrum of the trait, which covered the same 
range as the original scale. The scale also showed gender invariance, 
which demonstrates its suitability to measure the NFC trait among 
male and female participants. This result complements recent find-
ings regarding the age invariance of NFC between 18-99 years of age 
(Soubelet & Salthouse, 2017).
The validity results demonstrated that the short version of the scale 
(see Appendix for the final list of items) showed the same (or even 
stronger) relationships with several related constructs as the original 
scale. In particular, as expected, the NFC-10 showed moderate rela-
tions with various measures of cognitive skills (i.e., fluid intelligence, 
cognitive reflection, probabilistic reasoning skills, arithmetic fluency) 
and self-report measures of cognitive styles (i.e., verbal, spatial and 
object visualizer), confidence in one’s numerical skills (i.e., subjective 
numeracy) and mathematics anxiety. In line with previous studies re-
garding the validity of the NFC scale (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Soubelet & 
Salthouse, 2017), these correlations were low to moderate. 
An interesting and somewhat unexpected finding was that, whereas 
the verbal and spatial thinking styles were positively related to NFC, 
the object-visualizer thinking style showed a negative relationship, 
which was even stronger in the case of the NFC-10. This thinking style 
has been found to be associated with holistic processing, spontaneity, 
and artistic creations which offer a multiplicity of meanings (Pérez-
Fabello et al., 2016). At the same time, this thinking style is negatively 
related to mathematical and visual-spatial reasoning (e.g., Hegarty & 
Kozhevnikov, 1999; Pitta-Pantazi et al., 2013). Although it is easy to see 
how this cognitive style might contrast with an analytical approach, this 
result is still somewhat puzzling given the strong links between NFC 
and curiosity (Cacioppo et al., 1996), as well as openness (Soubelet & 
Salthouse, 2017), which could be expected to relate to artistic interests. 
It would be interesting to conduct further studies regarding the links 
between NFC and both the production and appreciation of art, as this 
seems to be a neglected area so far.
Regarding the limitations of our study, we could mention that 
the participants were all university students, representing a relatively 
homogeneous population in terms of their age and intellectual ability. 
Future studies with a more heterogeneous sample could be useful for 
conducting further analyses regarding differential item functioning, 
for example, by comparing participants from different age groups, or 
participants with different levels of education. Nevertheless, even in the 
current sample, we have obtained a good range of scores on all meas-
ures, including both versions of the NFC scale. Another limitation is 
the range of validity measures, which mostly included measures of in-
telligence, quantitative skills and related thinking styles. Future studies 
could use a broader range of measures, including the measurement of 
constructs that could be expected to correlate strongly with NFC, such 
as the personality dimension of openness. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, overall, our results confirm that 
we have obtained a much shorter version of the NFC that maintains 
excellent reliability and validity. Thus, the NFC-10 could be a very con-
venient and useful instrument for future studies.
Figure 2.
test information function (tiF) of the original 18-item need For cognition (nFc) scale (left) and the 10-item nFc scale (right). 
latent trait (theta) is shown on the horizontal axis (higher values mean higher nFc), and the amount of information and the 
SE yielded by the test at each trait level is shown on the vertical axis.
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footnotes
1 An advantage of using the extended version of the scale is that, 
due to the popularity of the scale, the original items are widely known, 
although a recent paper has argued that this does not affect the correla-
tion between the Cognitive Reflection Test and other measures (Bialek 
& Pennycook, 2017).
2 Location parameters are the thresholds that separate the response 
options of the Likert scale indicating on which part of the range of 
θ people have a 50% chance of selecting each option given their θ 
level. The need for cognition items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale. 
Therefore, each item has four (the number of response options minus 
1) b parameters (i.e., the thresholds that separate 1 from 2–5 options, 
1–2 from 3–5, 1–3 from 4–5, and 1–4 from 5).
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AppendIx A
The 10-item Need for Cognition Scale. Items that are reverse scored 
are marked by asterisks.
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that re-
quires a lot of thinking.
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.*
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than 
something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.*
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a 
chance I will have to think in depth about something.*
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
7. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals 
to me.
8. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions 
to problems.
9. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
10. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and impor-
tant to one that is somewhat important but does not require much 
thought.
